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Historical Sociology and Sociological History: 
Theory and Practice1
Claude S. Fischer 
Department of Sociology 
University of California, Berkeley 
USA
My topic is the methodological encounter of sociology and history, 
"methodological" defined broadly to include the framing of questions and 
answers, as well as the use of evidence. My three basic points will be: (1) 
sociologists and historians have much to gain from mixing their work, even in 
face of critiques that have been raised against that; (2) despite this mixing in 
recent decades, some profound differences between the disciplines remain, 
and (3) underneath the differences, there are some common needs and some 
common ground. I do not have a method to propose, or a solution to various 
problems. I do have some thoughts that might be of use.
Rhetoric
I will frame the topic by talking about "rhetoric." Social scientists have 
recently been discussing rhetoric in economics, sociology, history, and other 
disciplines. By this word, they do not mean the art of speechmaking; they 
mean the methods and assumptions behind persuasion in the sciences. How 
do scientists persuade one another of the truth of what they say? This
1 This paper is a slightly revised version of a lecture presented to a seminar, 




























































































concern leads us to the shared assumptions and agreed-upon rules that we 
appeal to when we try to persuade.
At base, all social scientists share certain common assumptions. We 
accept basic rules of western logic; we believe that claims have to be assessed 
against perceptions of the real world that can be shared by others.2 We do 
not credit claims based on revelation, personal authority, anecdote, and so 
forth. Beyond such agreement, there are noteworthy differences. Much of 
contemporary sociology rests on the deductive model, the form of persuasion 
common in the hard sciences, which requires posing hypotheses for 
falsification and testing evidence against those hypotheses. Other forms of 
sociology use the natural history model, closer to life sciences, wherein the 
researcher gathers observations and generalizes from them. The researcher is 
persuasive to the extent to which he or she can accumulate enough consistent 
observations. Think here of classic participant-observation studies. A third 
form, which is history’s typical form, is the narrative model. The researcher 
gathers observations and orders them in a coherent and meaningful sequence. 
That coherence is often in the form of a plot structure not unlike those in 
fiction. (1 will discuss plots more later.) And the persuasiveness depends not 
only on the accuracy of the observations, but also on the extent to which the 
sequence makes sense — in particular, whether the first observations are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the later observations. Are we more 
persuaded that the foolishness of the royal family led to the French 
Revolution or that the rise of bourgeoisie did? Which story makes more 
sense?
2 Subjectivist and postmodernist critics claim to cast doubt on this foundation for 
science, but they cannot. They still make assertions about the nature of the world and 




























































































For now, I simply place these distinctions on the table. I will return to 
them later, after discussing the encounter of sociology and history in recent 
decades.
I come to this topic as a sociologist, but one who has spent more time 
reading history than sociology in the last decade, who has published roughly 
as much in history as in sociology recently, and whose latest book, America 
Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940 (1992), has gotten more 
attention from historians than from sociologists. The study examined how the 
telephone diffused among residential users in the United States: how it was 
sold, to whom, for what use and to what end. Empirically, the study includes 
analyses of internal documents of telephone companies, statistical analyses of 
telephone and automobile diffusion; oral history; documentary community 
history; and examination of etiquette manuals — a total compendium. It falls 
into the categories of both the history and the sociology of technology, 
although I like to think it was broader than that. Since that book, I have 
continued largely reading in American history. One result is that I have 
become quite sensitive to disciplinary lines.
I need to add that my scholarly expertise rests with American history 
(and American sociology). Within American history, I know best the work in 
community history. Most of my examples will come from that field. But the 
applications should be broader than that. In several places, I will use the 
example of my book on telephone history.
The Convergences o f History and Sociology




























































































have blurred as practitioners from both disciplines have undertaken similar 
projects. One well-known and controversial strand of work is the effort by 
some sociologists to provide macro-sociological interpretations of history, 
synthesizing historical studies. I refer to people such as Skocpol and 
Goldstone. This synthesizing used to be the terrain of grand historians. But I 
am thinking about even closer mixing of the disciplines than that, of 
sociologists doing historical research and historians doing sociological 
analyses.
One example is the study of collective violence. Charles Tilly is 
certainly the major figure here, with his empirical studies of rebellions and 
strikes. Other sociologists also have conducted such research, Mark Traugout 
and Susan Olzak, for instance. But historians, from George Rude on, have 
done so, too. They collect original reports on riots and rebellions and try to 
understand who was involved and why. Another example is historical 
demography or demographic history. The reconstruction and analysis of 
family structures long ago, stimulated by Laslett and the Cambridge group, 
includes sociologists such as Susan Watkins, Barbara Laslett, and Avery 
Guest, as well as many historians such as Daniel Scott Smith and Tamara 
Hareven. Both groups examine old censuses, church records, and tax listings 
to understand who lived with whom. Examples can be multiplied — in
the area of women’s studies, religion, crime, and others: Sociologists are 
using history and doing research on historical evidence; historians are using 
sociology and applying sociological analysis to their materials.
This convergence was institutionalized in the late 1970s with the 
formation of the Social Science History Association, an organization of 




























































































contemporary periods and use historical — i.e., archival — materials. They 
also typically study issues raised by social scientists, draw on theories from 
social science, and apply methods, usually quantitative, developed by social 
scientists. Key founders of the organization were quantitative historians who 
felt themselves outcasts within the discipline of history.
Despite this convergence, this fellowship, and this commingling, my 
experience is that discipline still matters. There remain differences between 
the way sociologists approach certain questions and the way historians do. 
These differences are important. I will address them later, but first will 
address the questions, Why should sociologists do history?, and Why should 
historians do sociology?, because this convergence has been criticized by 
practitioners in each discipline.
Why Should Sociologists Do History ?
The standard division of labor between history and sociology is that the 
former study specific cases and the latter develop general theories. Put more 
crudely, as some historians have, historians are glorified research assistants 
for sociological theorists. The more sophisticated versions of this distinction 
describe history as idiographic — concerned with "cultural and historical 
particulars" — and sociology as nomothetic — seeking "to establish general 
laws" as natural sciences do.3 If so, why should sociologists study specific 
cases, as I did by studying the early history of the telephone in the United 
States? Why not study a sample of countries, or a sample of technologies? 
This is one concern, that sociologists get trapped in particular cases.




























































































Another critique, raised by John Goldthorpe for example,4 is that 
historical data — "relics" from the past — are inferior as data to what 
sociologists can obtain today. If the research question is a general one about 
social phenomena, a sociologist ought to collect his or her own data rather 
than rely on archival material. That way the researcher can design the data- 
gathering to make the evidence reliable, valid, and representative, features 
much harder to obtain with the "found evidence" historians must use. So, in 
my own case it might be argued that, if my interest was in who adopted the 
telephone, when, and why, then 1 should have done a contemporary study. I 
could have, for example, studied the diffusion of the telephone today in a less 
developed nation than the United States, or perhaps studied the diffusion of a 
different technology — the computer, perhaps — in the U.S. Then, 1 could 
have designed research that called for just the data I needed and that insured 
representativeness.5
My reply to the general question of why sociologists should do history 
focusses, for now, on three points.
One, sociology is inherently an historical science. It has always been 
wrong to use physics as our role model. The real role models are the life 
sciences — zoology, geology, paleontology, especially evolutionary biology. 
The life sciences recognize that current structures are the results of historical 
conjunctures. To use a common phrase today, current structures are "path-
4 "The Uses of History in Sociology: A Reply," British Journal of Sociology 
(March, 1994): 55-77; with debate in the same issue.
5 Ironically, another scholar and I had made a proposal to the World Bank in the 
early 1980s to study the process of telecommunications development in a few third- 
world nations. But the Bank was not interested in the detailed longitudinal, 




























































































dependent." If an asteroid had not wiped out dinosaurs millions of years ago, 
humans may never have existed. If Australia had not separated from Asia, 
we probably would not have kangaroos today. Similarly, at least some 
features of current world culture may well have been different if the French 
had defeated the British in North America. We cannot understand current 
social patterns except as the products of historical development and historical 
context.6 The frequent failure of sociologists to recognize the historical 
location of their arguments often drives historians mad.
So, with regard to the telephone: The introduction of this technology 
into society as a novel form of human interaction happened only once. While 
there is much to be learned from contemporary telephone development 
elsewhere — who subscribes to it and why — contemporary diffusion takes 
place in an environment of municipal telephones, radio, television, and so on. 
If, as I suspect, the introduction of new technologies at the turn of the century 
was a key historical moment, it only happened once.
Two, it is often critical to know the beginning, middle, and end of the 
story. How well can one understand, say, mobilization for political action, by 
just cutting a slice in time and learning who is active at that moment? 
Mobilization rises and falls; time is critical. That is probably one motivation 
for the increasing work with longitudinal data even in studies of social
"  Docs that mean that 1 eschew sociological research that is synchronic or 
sociological research that seeks general, ahistorical laws? No. I’ve done that work 
myself. It vitally informs our understanding of how historical processes might unfold; 
while the history provides the context for understanding the contemporary patterns.
For example, research has demonstrated the general patterns of diffusion of innovation 
across class; this can be used to understand the cases of the telephone and automobile. 
History enables us to understand, at least partly, why the working class in the U.S. 





























































































mobility and attitudes, an understanding that lifecycle position and cohort are 
critical. In America Calling. I asked who obtained the telephone, but the 
answer to that question depended on the year. Telephone subscription meant 
one thing when only five percent of Americans had telephones at home, 
another when that percentage went to 30 percent.
Three, historical evidence sometimes is the only evidence we have and 
can be extremely revealing, despite major problems of sampling, 
representativeness, and interpretation. For example, scholars interested in 
economic arrangements among elite families will probably find more evidence 
about past families than about current ones. John Padgett, for instance, has 
studied the networks of interconnection of the Medicis. In the U.S., census 
information is sealed for 70 years, so researchers often know some things 
more accurately about people’s grandparents than about people living today.
In the case of America Calling. I was able to find out more about the internal 
deliberations of the telephone company by reading their century-old 
correspondence than I could find out today. Also, I was able to link 
telephone subscriptions to census information in ways I could not do today 
(in part because so many Americans today have unlisted telephone numbers). 
And although censuses 70-90 years ago were far from perfect, they had better 
response rates than most American surveys do today.





























































































Why Should Historians Do Sociology?
I cannot speak for historians, but there is certainly a debate on that side 
of the line. I will mention two critiques of the new social history that have 
arisen. One attacks historians’ adoption of sociological theories, whether 
those theories be functionalist, marxist, or whatever. Such abstractions, it is 
said, oversimplify historical complexities, ignore the role of agents, and 
provide mechanistic explanations. Instead, historians ought to return to 
narrative, to telling stories of actors engaged in concrete events, allowing the 
sequence to provide the explanation. A second critique takes aim at the use 
of quantitative data. Quantification reduces subtleties to crude categories, 
goes the argument.
It will be up to historians to fight these battles, but 1 comment on both 
points. One: Some historians do employ simple (often outdated) sociological 
theories and apply them crudely. Also, when historians themselves indulge in 
broad theorizing, they often mimic the least appealing aspects of sociological 
theorizing — overreaching, simplification, distance from empirical grounding. 
Still, the key observation is this (and it has been made by others): All 
historical narratives include within them implicit social theory or theories.
I’ll discuss this more later, but one implication of this observation is that it 
may be far better to present and defend explicit theories than to bury them in 
narratives.
Two: The fear of quantitative data is misplaced. As I repeatedly tell 
Berkeley doctoral students in my own methods course, the qualitative- 
quantitative distinction is fallacious. The real issues concern the logic of 




























































































for example, one studies organizations, then what are different types of 
organizations and how can the researcher tell one from another? Or, what are 
different types of collective violence and how can the researcher tell one from 
another? How one later chooses to summarize one’s observations, by verbal 
summary ("many" versus "few") or numerical summary ("45%" versus "7%"), 
is largely a matter of practical convenience.
These are quite broad issues of logic and evidence that arise in the 
meeting of sociology and history. And arguments about them should not 
inhibit sociologists from doing history and vice-versa. But in coming 
together, practitioners discover subtle differences between disciplines that do 
inhibit a full meeting of minds. I now turn to those.
Disciplinary Differences in Logic and Evidence
In this section, I will discuss three topics: the questions sociologists and 
historians ask, the answers they give, and the evidence they use. The 
interesting differences are not the crude ones, but the subtle ones. Recall my 
earlier distinction among rhetorics based on hypothesis-testing, cumulative 
natural observation, and narration.
Questions Asked. The simple distinction here is that historians ask 
what is the story behind a specific event, while most sociologists ask what is 
the theory that explains a class of events. That is consistent with the 
distinction in rhetoric I made earlier. So, for example, a historian might ask 
about the origins of the French Revolution, a sociologist about theories that 
explain revolutions in general; the historian might ask why Napoleon became 





























































































While grossly valid, these distinctions — ideographic versus 
nomothetic, particularizing versus generalizing — often break down in 
practice. Sociologists frequently study particular cases —  the rise of the Civil 
Rights movement in the U.S.A., or the spread of the telephone. Historians 
study particular cases, but often do so because they are, in truth, interested in 
general phenomena. Certainly, the study of specific labor histories is 
motivated by many historians’ desires to understand the general principles 
behind labor mobilization, just as the study of detailed features of women’s 
history is spurred by the motivation to say something general about women’s 
positions in society. Historians are usually driven by the same general 
concerns as sociologists, often arising out of contemporary politics or personal 
issues.
Take, for example, an argument current in American social history over 
whether colonial American farmers were either early capitalists who engaged, 
individualistically, in rational economic use of their lands, or tradition-and- 
community-directed pre-capitalists who only became individualistic capitalists 
after the growth in commercial agriculture between 1800 and 1850. Why is 
this question important? Why is this story important? Because many believe 
that the answer will tell us whether capitalism is good or bad, and also 
whether future transformation of American individualism is possible or not.
If Americans were always individualistic and capitalistic, that implies one 
prospect; if Americans were not always so, that implies a different vision of 
change. My point is that historians’ concern about this topic is not that 
different from theoretical issues that drive many sociologists, but historians to 




























































































Disciplinary differences, thus, appear even where there are areas of 
common interest. It is a matter of foregrounding and backgrounding. The 
historians put the detailed case in the foreground and leave the general themes 
as vague background. The sociologists tend to reverse the emphasis. One 
example of such differences is the search by sociologists for comparisons to 
look for other cases for similarities and differences. For example, I compared 
the case of the telephone to the case of the automobile, and compared 
American telephone history to that of Europe. For the historian, these 
comparisons may seem unnecessary. For the sociologist, they are critical to 
making the explicit causal claims.7 It is for similar reasons that sociologists 
typically entertain counterfactuals. Another distinction that results from 
emphasizing either story or theory is that historians are less explicit than 
sociologists would like about the general questions and theoretical 
presumptions that drive their work, while the sociologists tend to be careful 
about that and sometimes sloppy about the details of the cases.
Answers Given. Some historians prefer to believe that they do not 
explain, that they interpret. (A few even cite anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
to justify the interpretive rather than explanatory approach.) Here I have to 
express skepticism. Historians, even Geertzian anthropologists, usually 
explain. Their theories are latent in the interpretations they give or stories 
they tell. That shows up in the narratives they provide, which brings me to 
another difference between disciplines: the stress by historians on narrative 
and agency, compared to sociologists’ stress on theory and structure.
When historians explain, they do so by imbedding the theory in the
7 In these examples, both comparisons allowed me to make the case that absence 




























































































story they tell. The preferred manner of exposition is the story, from Act I 
through Act III. Sociologists do their explaining by presenting a set of 
variables, showing intercorrelations, and presuming that some are causally 
prior to others, so that they explain the outcomes. The causal claim is 
explicit. Historians imbed the implicit causal claim in their story line. In 
rhetorical terms, historians tend to employ plots — conventional story lines 
— while sociologists often rely on theoretical ideal types — patterns of 
correlations.
As Hayden White has shown, historians tend to rely on common 
narrative plots to structure their accounts. Much of the persuasiveness of an 
historical explanation depends on whether it resonates with a classic.plot. 
Among the classic plots available to historians are heroic triumph, tragedy, 
and farce. In the first, heroism, the hero faces obstacles but triumphs in the 
end. Such plots, which made generals and whole peoples seem noble, are not 
popular among American historians these days, except perhaps among those 
trying to write uplifting accounts of oppressed people. Tragedy involves a 
theme of rise and fall, wherein profound meaning is extracted from the story. 
In American historiography, for example, some accounts of the New England 
Puritans have this structure: The Puritans built virtuous communities in the 
wilderness, but the communities contained the seeds of their own destruction, 
their vulnerability to capitalism. From this story, we learn about the tragedy 
of modernity. Some histories of immigrant groups in the U.S. also have this 
tragic structure; their plot lines are the corruption and disappearance of 
authentic culture. Farces deny any original nobility to the protagonists or 
morals to the story. For example, some accounts of revolutions suggest that 





























































































Historians persuade, then, by imbedding their particular accounts within 
familiar plots. It is their familiarity that makes them easy to accept. There is 
a version of American history — now discredited by most -— called 
"progressive" or "consensus" history, which is largely a heroic story: Brave 
Americans built a "new" nation out of the wilderness. The more common 
story in recent decades is the tragic legend called "the decline of community." 
Once Americans lived in gemeinschaft communities.8 Then, in Act II, 
trouble came. One version of such trouble might be population growth and 
urbanization; in another version, it might be commercial agriculture. This 
trouble ended community and instead we have a "mass society." Implicit in 
such plots are particular theoretical claims — for instance, that increases in 
population undermine social ties.
While the story of decline of community is very broad, it has many 
specific applications. Take, as an example of a specific subplot, the story of 
voluntary associations — clubs, lodges, brotherhoods, etc. These grew 
tremendously in the U.S. during the 19th Century. Many historians who 
apply the general decline of community plot also posit an implicit psycho­
social theory about organizations — a theory one might label the 
"compensation" model. Joining associations was the way urban Americans in 
the 19th Century "compensated" for losses of fellowship in their cities and/or 
for the anxieties of modern life. This somewhat Freudian explanation is often 
smuggled into a narrative. The historian will first describe an apparent 
problem, such as rapid turnover in population, or expansion of factories, and 
then in a subsequent section describe the growth of voluntary associations.
8 For some this "once upon a time" was as recently as before World War II, in 





























































































The historian will link the two by a simple phrase, such as "Worried by urban 
anonymity, Americans joined...," or "To ease their loneliness, Americans 
joined..." Here is a whole theory of human action smuggled into a narrative.
A sociologist might instead, using a quasi-deductive approach, pose a specific 
hypothesis, such as "19th-Century Americans suffered from social isolation; 
voluntary associations reduced that suffering; therefore, they joined 
associations." There would be various ways to test that proposition in 
standard ways.
If historians hide causal theories in their stories, it is also true that 
sociologists hide stories in their theories. Hidden in many sociologists’ 
concepts, models, and general perspectives are assumptions about historical 
differences and sequences. One typical theoretical (and rhetorical) device is 
the "ideal type." These ideal types are statements abut the systematic 
correlations among various properties. A classic one is the ideal type of 
"community," which assumes that certain properties of social relations are 
correlated: small size, intimacy, permanence, localism, and the like combine 
to define "community," or gemeinschaft. Another ideal type is "modern 
society," which, in the classic Parsonian formulation, included universalism, 
affective neutrality, as well as high technological development. But basic also 
to such sociologists’ formulations is an implicit, sometimes explicit, historical 
claim. "Community" was before, "association" is now; "traditional" was 
before, "modern" is now, and so on.
Let us take a specific example of such assumptions, one that has 
intrigued me for years. When many American sociologists write about social 
problems, or social "disintegration," they often worry about rates of residential 




























































































distinctive of modern, non-community society, because they assume that 
residential mobility has increased historically. They are wrong about that 
assumption, about that story, as most social historians could tell them. But, 
that assumption is often a key part of the ideal types they deal with.
So, both disciplines employ plots and theories. What differentiates 
them, often, is which is explicit and which is implicit, the story or the causal 
model; which is foreground and which is background.
A related and familiar distinction that arises in the answers historians 
and sociologists give is that between agency and structure. Historians stress 
the preferences and choices of the individuals, while sociologists stress the 
structure individuals face that shape their preferences and limit their choices. 
Clearly, here, some balance is needed. The romanticization in recent years of 
"agency" may be a useful corrective to overly determinative structuralism, but 
it can go to far. For example, much of recent writings in the U.S. about 
oppressed groups — women, racial minorities — has been premised on the 
notion that too much of previous writing had treated these groups as victims, 
as pawns of the oppressors, as simply the objects of structural forces. So, 
instead, the new writers stress the extent to which these groups "resisted," 
were active agents in their own lives and overcame oppressive structures.
That is all noble, but, in the end, exaggerates the range of freedom such 
people had to be agents.
Despite these criticisms of the way historians answer questions, there is 
much for sociologists to learn. Far too much sociology stays at the level of 
correlations among structural variables. What is often lacking is a 




























































































Who did what to whom? Until a patterns of correlation is translated into a 
concrete narrative linking cause to consequence, it is all too abstract. And it 
is an unsatisfactory explanation. For example, the arguments sociologists 
make about structural differentiation during modernization are often 
disembodied, abstract processes, the shift from one ideal type to another. 
Historians have provided some rich narratives with agency that make those 
abstractions concrete — for example, describing the process by which master 
craftsmen became employers of craft labor, separated their families from the 
workshop, then moved their families into separate neighborhoods. Here, we 
see one aspect of differentiation in concrete action. Would that more 
sociologists gave us such narratives with clear senses of agency and thereby 
made clear what mere correlations often obscure.
I learned a lesson about this point many years ago from a doctoral 
student of mine. It was a lesson about writing and about rhetoric. We were 
co-authoring a book and she complained that in my draft all I talked about 
was variables. Level of education did this, gender did that; size of city 
affected this; etc. People should be the subjects of sentences, she said, not 
variables. She was right and ever since I have been sensitive to this point — 
not only as a point of rhetoric, but as a point of logic. People do things; 
variables only reflect their action.
To conclude this section on how historians and sociologists answer 
questions, historians tend to answer with stories that have imbedded plots and 
attribute agency. Theory is there, but hidden. Sociologists tend to answer 
with theoretical claims that stress structure. But familiar plots are often 





























































































Evidence. I begin this topic with a small story from my book on the 
telephone. Although the book has received positive reviews from historians, 
a couple of them have specifically objected to one footnote. In this footnote, 
I explicitly say that I am not much interested in certain kinds of evidence 
about the history of the telephone: evidence from fiction, movies, or other 
forms of art. The reason, I argued, was that one cannot tell with art whether 
the creator is reflecting reality, challenging reality, or playing with reality. I 
will return to this footnote later.
The basic distinction between the evidence historians use and the 
evidence sociologists use is between found evidence, the "relics" or the 
"footprints" of human action, and constructed evidence, evidence gathered by 
the researcher specifically to address a question. From this flows all sorts of 
different practices. For example, historians worry about the provenance of 
evidence — who wrote this text and why? How was it preserved and why? 
Sociologists worry about research design issues such as sampling frames, 
question-wording, and so on.
The difference is not as absolute as it seems. Sociologists often use 
found evidence. After all, census data, economic statistics and the like were 
constructed by other people for other purposes, just like church baptismal 
records were produced for other purposes than reconstructing family history. 
And historians have been known to formulate their own evidence, most 
notably, through the use of oral history. More important, while it may seem 
that sociologists attend to issues of data representativeness, reliability, and 
validity, while historians do not, so that the sociologists’ evidence is better, 
this need not be the case. As Marc Bloch described many years ago in The 




























































































these sorts of issues in mind. I have colleagues in sociology who will state 
that, in the end, historical materials are more believable than survey data.
Historians do often face the problem of missing evidence. If the record 
is silent on certain points, one cannot even imagine producing the needed 
evidence in the ways sociologists can today. For example, I would love to 
know how Americans 80 years ago weighed the costs and benefits of 
subscribing to telephone service. But I have found no record of such 
deliberations, at best only dim reflections of such deliberations. So, historians 
struggle with silences in ways that sociologists typically need not. (I should 
say, in principle, sociologists need not. In practice, sociologists often reach a 
point in their analyses where they realize that they lack some crucial piece of 
the puzzle. Some question, now seen to be critical, was not asked. Then, 
they, too, must deal with silences.) But the critical — albeit subtle — 
distinction lies, I feel, in the difference between being story-driven versus 
theory-driven.
Historians, in telling their stories, feel compelled to tell a complete one. 
To do so, when the record is fragmented, means taking whatever evidence 
lies around that is at all trustworthy and weaving it into a narrative, 
particularly taking whatever evidence that can fill the silences. In this regard, 
I wrote another footnote in my book. It explained the anecdote about the 
"light under the lamppost." In this story, one dark night, a man comes across 
another, obviously drunk man searching the ground around a lamppost. The 
passerby asks the drunk what he is looking for. The drunk replies that he has 
lost his keys. Where, asks the first, did you lose your keys? The drunk 
waves his hand in the direction of a dark alley. Then, why are you searching 




























































































is! There is a tendency for historians, being story-driven, to look for 
evidence wherever the light is and follow that trail wherever it goes, while 
sociologist remain more directed by the question.9
(This, by the way, is one reason, although only one, why social history 
has taken a turn toward cultural studies. Reconstructing social life, say, the 
nature of marital relations centuries ago, is hobbled by silences, since few 
representative couples have left us accounts. But there are many cultural 
products to study.)
Sociologists, in contrast, look for evidence that confronts theory. It 
may be partial evidence, incomplete for telling the story, but if it is well- 
placed theoretically, it suffices. So, for example, in my study of the 
telephone, one issue was what people used the telephone for. And in that 
regard, I looked at gender differences. I conducted statistical analyses to 
identify the effect of there being women in the household on the probability 
that a household had a telephone; I read industry documents for telephone 
salesmen’s impressions of women’s and men’s attitudes; and I looked at our 
oral histories for gender differences. The result was that I found a 
correlation between gender and telephone use, but not a story.
And, so back to the debated footnote, my dismissal of cultural 
representations as evidence and the historians’ desire to use them as evidence. 
This disagreement is related to another over what is preferred as evidence: 
Historians often take observers’ comments about social phenomena as
9 Stephen Lukes has reminded me of another use of the lamppost metaphor, one 
that can bet turned against the sociologist: The researcher uses statistics as a drunk 




























































































evidence about them, while sociologists are suspicious of such comments.
For example, Carolyn Marvin wrote a fine book about the history of the 
telephone in the U.S. based largely on contemporary comments by journalists 
and leaders in the industry. I, however, paid relatively little attention to such 
materials. How could we know whether those commentators were accurate 
observers? Would such evidence reliably test theory?
One reason that such cultural expressions and observers’ comments are 
valuable to historians, however, is that such materials help fill those silent 
gaps in the story line. The contemporary observers often serve as narrators of 
the story themselves. And cultural products allow speculation about hidden 
processes. For example, if one wants to know how Americans felt about the 
telephone in the 19th Century, one cannot interview them. But novels, art, 
popular essays, all these "discourses," can be examined for signs about 
feelings or consciousness.
As is evident, I have reservations about such evidence. Instead, I 
worked far more deductively. As a sociologist, 1 identified points of 
theoretical leverage and sought out evidence that spoke to those points. For 
example, another question 1 had was whether Americans found the telephone 
threatening or anxiety-provoking. My assistants and 1 searched for evidence 
that spoke to this point. We looked at newspaper accounts during the critical 
period to see how they treated the subject of the telephone; we found market 
survey research 60 years old that had asked relevant questions; we asked 
elderly people to recall their experiences of the telephone. These are not 
ideal types of evidence, but they are much better than, say, contemporary 




























































































All this said implies a clear preference for the sociological rather than 
historical approach to evidence. But I underline that there is another side to 
the debate: Being able to tell the story is as important as being able to assess 
the correlation. So, I was concerned with finding evidence that told the story 
of the telephone industry and of its executives, and to tell the stories of how 
three communities experienced the telephone from 1890 to 1940, and to tell 
the stories of specific people’s experience with the telephone. The stories 
matter rhetorically, as a means of persuasion, and logically as a way of 
understanding how cause and effect works out in concrete cases. Without a 
persuasive narrative, the correlations are mere abstractions.
Conclusion. It is no surprise that, as a trained sociologist, I find some 
aspects of how historians analyze questions and treat evidence puzzling and 
unsatisfactory. But I have learned to appreciate much of their approach. As 
sociologists and historians continue to work side-by-side on some major 
issues, it will be important to understand and appreciate what each provides in 
the common endeavor. As a sociologist, I have become aware that stories are 
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